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Fleeing the Rat’s Nest
TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE AFTER ORTIZ V.
WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent opinion in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
clarified its standard for reviewing Title VII evidence in
employment discrimination cases, ushering forth a drastically
more plaintiff-friendly standard in the process.1 Ortiz is wellworth exploring for the following reasons. Practically, the new
standard will affect employees in how their evidence is
evaluated in employment cases in the Seventh Circuit. From
an employee’s perspective this is a positive change, but the
likely increase in the number of charges filed under Title VII
poses a possible challenge to the judicial system.2 But more
important to this note, Ortiz suggests a shift away from
longstanding federal Title VII jurisprudence to a more holistic
approach. This, in turn, has wide implications on the usefulness
of a tangled but delicate web of standards that courts have
created to resolve Title VII claims.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,3 decided in 1973, set
forth the standard for judicial review of Title VII employment
discrimination claims nearly a decade after the Civil Rights Act
was born4 and has been the law since. Exploring the Ortiz
decision, however, it is apparent that the Seventh Circuit may
have indirectly relegated the McDonnell Douglas analysis to
the sideline.5 In the Ortiz opinion, while affirming McDonnell
Douglas as the proper standard, Judge Easterbrook also
explained that when it comes to a plaintiff’s discrimination
Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).
Comparing five-year periods from 2001–2005 and 2011–2015 there has been a
17 percent increase in the number of discrimination charges filed nationally. Charge
Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC): FY 1997 Through FY 2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N [hereinafter EEOC Charge Statistics], https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/9YNB-37MW].
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
4 See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981).
5 Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765.
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claim at the summary judgment stage, evidence “must be
evaluated as a whole,” and that courts should avoid applying a
“rat’s nest of surplus tests.”6 As a result of this language,
employers within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit may have
a more difficult time prevailing at the summary judgment stage,7
as courts will now evaluate plaintiffs’ evidence as a whole8—
whether the evidence is direct or indirect (circumstantial)
evidence of discrimination—rather than using the “rat’s nest”
multipronged tests and standards that have developed since
McDonnell Douglas.9
The development and respective confusion over the
various divergent tests and standards has infected even the
Supreme Court. For instance, prior to Ortiz, the Court
attempted to clarify the application of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis to Title VII retaliation claims10 in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.11 In Nassar, responding
to the general confusion over what causation standard applied to
retaliation claims, the Court held that “Title VII [employment
discrimination] retaliation claims must be proved according to
traditional principles of but-for causation” which “requires proof

Id. at 766 (internal quotations omitted).
The district court in Ortiz granted summary judgment to Werner, the
employer. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 763. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a
court will “determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, which is
the case where ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party.’” Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d
560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986)). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
8 See, e.g., Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir.
2016) (“The parties discuss the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ evidence of causation and debate
whether the record demonstrates a ‘convincing mosaic’ establishing retaliatory discharge,
but we have recently jettisoned that approach in favor of a more straightforward inquiry:
Does the record contain sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude
that retaliatory motive caused the discharge?”).
9 Scholars, like judges, have proposed solutions to the problems that
McDonnell Douglas promote in the past—yet cases like Ortiz demonstrate why the issue
deserves continued treatment and scrutiny. See generally Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky,
Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in
Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659 (1998); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling
Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 703 (1995).
10 See infra Section I.A. An example of Title VII retaliation claim might
involve an employer demoting an employee for complaining to a manager about some
form of discrimination. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555
U.S. 271, 273 (2009) (Title VII’s protection against retaliation applies to “employee[s] who
speak[ ] out about discrimination . . . in answering questions during an employer’s
internal investigation”).
11 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
6
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that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the
absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”12
But Nassar’s new rule only seemed to further confuse
courts in analyzing Title VII cases in the following years. Lower
courts began to ask: to which prong of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis did the “but for” causation requirement apply?13 Federal
courts of appeals have since applied the “but for” requirement to
the first prong,14 the third (pretext) prong,15 and have also
suggested that it applies to the entire analysis.16 Other courts have
stated that Nassar did not affect the McDonnell Douglas analysis.17
This has resulted in a messy circuit split. The Tenth
Circuit applies the “but for” requirement to one prong, while
the Third and Fourth Circuits have indicated that the “but for”
requirement applies to a different prong.18 One can thus read
Ortiz as a signal to the legal community in the U.S. that at
least some judges or courts may be growing tired of applying
the confusing “rat’s nest” of multipronged tests when it comes
to McDonnell Douglas and Title VII employment
discrimination cases.
This note explores Ortiz in depth, how other circuits
analyze McDonnell Douglas and Title VII claims, and how
Ortiz relates to McDonnell Douglas and its progeny and Title
VII jurisprudence in general. Part I provides a brief
background on (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
motivation behind employment discrimination legislation; and
(2) the McDonnell Douglas framework and its rationale. Part II
Id. at 2533.
See Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors of S. Univ., 656 F. App’x 30, 33 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2016) (acknowledging the “disagreement among the circuits regarding whether
[Nassar] requires a plaintiff to show but-for causation as part of [a] prima facie case of
retaliation, or only at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework to rebut an
employer’s legitimate stated reason for the adverse employment action”).
14 Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., 830 F.3d 1178, 1191 n.7 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting
that in certain situations the “plaintiff must show evidence of but-for causation at the prima
facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework” while also acknowledging that other
circuits disagree).
15 See Young v. City of Phila. Police Dep’t, 651 F. App’x 90, 92 (3d Cir. 2016)
(finding that the district court erred in applying the “but for” requirement at the prima
facie stage as opposed to at the pretext stage); Nicholson v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc.,
830 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 2016) (if the defendant provides a legitimate reason for
employee’s termination, a plaintiff “must then rebut [the] explanation as pretextual, that is,
she must prove [the defendant] would not have terminated her but for her age”).
16 Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“As the district court noted, the plaintiff ’ s burden to show pretext merges with the
plaintiff ’ s ultimate burden of persuading the court that she was a victim of intentional
discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17 Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“We therefore hold that Nassar does not alter the causation prong of a prima facie case
of retaliation.”).
18 See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
12

13

728

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

discusses Nassar and how since 2013 courts have struggled to
apply McDonnell Douglas in a uniform way, with the Supreme
Court only adding to the confusion. Part III analyzes Ortiz and
recounts subsequent reaction to the decision, and Part IV
reviews Ortiz’s possible effect on the McDonnell Douglas
analysis and Title VII claims going forward. Part V concludes
that courts should follow Ortiz’s lead and evaluate employees’
evidence as a whole at the summary judgment stage, rather
than applying different standards or sorting through indirect
and direct evidence.
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE

Because Ortiz foreshadows a possible departure from
established Title VII jurisprudence,19 it is useful to remember
why the analysis of Title VII cases is so important, why
employment discrimination jurisprudence matters today, and
how courts have evaluated Title VII claims over the last few
decades. If, as some have argued, the purpose of the law and
the judiciary is to promote justice,20 a brief history of Title VII
is needed in order to gain a sense of the purpose of the statute,
and why any changes to the balance the Supreme Court has
struck in its Title VII jurisprudence would be so impactful.
A.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Birth of Title VII

The enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1964 was
historic. Senator Hubert Humphrey, invoking the words of the
Founding Fathers and the U.S. Constitution’s preamble while
introducing the bill in Congress, remarked that it is the
responsibility of the government to recognize that the Preamble
was merely a prelude to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that the
iconic phrase read “We, the people of the United States—Not
See infra Part IV for reaction and commentary on Ortiz.
See Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge, 62 U.S. 35, 50 (1858) (“[I]t is the object of all
law to promote justice and honest dealing”); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 266 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the judiciary’s mission “of
administering justice impartially”); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (“The oath
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 453 that is taken by each person upon becoming a member of
the federal judiciary requires that he administer justice without respect to persons, and
do equal right to the poor and to the rich, that he faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon [him] . . . agreeably to the Constitution and laws of
the United States.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 284–85 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“From the earliest
days of the English courts, [courts] have encountered obstructions to doing that for which
they exist, namely, to administer justice impartially and solely with reference to what
comes before them.”).
19

20
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white people, colored people, short people, or tall people, but
simply: We the people.”21 In phrasing the passage of the bill in
such a way, Senator Humphrey made it clear that the purpose
of the Civil Rights Act was to help stem the tide of prejudice
and inequality in various realms of public and private life in
the United States.22
One driving force for the inclusion of Title VII in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was “to assure equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, in an effort to open employment opportunities
for African Americans in occupations which had been
traditionally closed to them.”23 In the years after the Act’s
passage, however, the courts struggled to determine what
elements would constitute a proper claim under Title VII’s
anti-employment discrimination provisions and were unable to
come to an agreement on how a Title VII claim should be
evaluated at the judicial level.24
21 88th Cong. Rec. 6527–28 (Mar. 30, 1964) (testimony of Senator Hubert
Humphrey); see also U.S. CONST. pmbl.
22 See Barefoot Sanders, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 TEX. B.J. 931, 1014
(1964) (“The venerable code of equity law commands ‘for every wrong, a remedy.’ But in
too many communities, in too many parts of the country, wrongs are inflicted on
[African American] citizens for which no effective remedy at law is clearly and readily
available.”); id. (discussing President Kennedy’s message to Congress regarding the
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963 and that Congressional inaction will lead to
“endangering domestic tranquility, retarding our Nation’s economic and social progress
and weakening the respect with which the rest of the world regards us”); see also
Paulette Brown, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 527, 532–34 (2014)
(“In President Kennedy’s televised national address on civil rights and race relations,
on June 11, 1963, he promised to enforce the civil rights of every American.” After
President Kennedy’s assassination “President Johnson proclaimed that ‘no memorial
oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory than the
earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long.’” President
Johnson later “reiterated the promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—’a civil rights law
that would eliminate from this Nation every trace of discrimination and oppression
that is based upon race or color.’”).
23 Ann K. Wooster, Title VII Race or National Origin Discrimination in
Employment–Supreme Court Cases, 182 A.L.R. Fed. 61 (2002) (internal citations
omitted); see also S. REP. NO. 88–352 at 6327 (1964) (explaining that Title VII is
designed to give African Americans and other minority groups “a fair chance to earn a
livelihood and contribute their talents to the building of a more prosperous America”);
id. at 6329 (“In [T]itle VII we seek to prevent discriminatory hiring practices. We seek
to give people an opportunity to be hired on the basis of merit, and to release the
tremendous talents of the American people, rather than to keep their talents buried
under prejudice or discrimination.”). Cf. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 230–55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reviewing Title VII’s
legislative history).
24 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1971)
(“This is not to say that actual intent or motive is irrelevant to determining whether
rights assured by Title VII have been infringed. In some instances the reasons for taking
particular action may determine whether the action is unlawfully discriminatory.”); Jones
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970) (“When a policy is
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis
of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[,]”25 and also makes
it unlawful for employers to retaliate against employees for filing
claims or attempting to resolve issues through Title VII.26 Title
VII also discusses the causation requirement in Section 2000e–
2(m), which provides that discriminatory employment actions
may be established by demonstrating that a plaintiff’s
membership in a protected class “was a motivating factor” for the
adverse employment action.27 Thus, the statutory regime
considers certain protected categories, including a provision to
prevent retaliatory actions, and also provides that a plaintiff
need only show that his or her protected trait was a motivating
factor of the adverse action, allowing for the existence of other
causes. Even with the safeguard of Title VII, however, courts
struggled to apply the new law.
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act but before
McDonnell Douglas, lower courts struggled to apply Title VII in
an evenhanded manner. In 1969, one district court judge
rejected a discharged employee’s Title VII claim based on racial
discrimination, even though the employee was allegedly
suspended for assisting other African American employees in
demonstrated to have discriminatory effects, it can be justified only by a showing that
it is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business.”).
25 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2018)) (“[I]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or . . . to fail or refuse to refer for employment,
or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of
his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because [an employee or applicant for employment] has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.”). See King v.
Pulaski Cty. Sch. Bd., 195 F. Supp. 3d 873, 882–83 (W.D. Va. 2016) (“Title VII makes it
unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for engaging in activity
protected by the statute.”); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 59 (2006) (“Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that
‘discriminate against’ an employee (or job applicant) because he has ‘opposed’ a practice
that Title VII forbids.”).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m). In Nassar, the Supreme Court discussed Section
2000e–2(m) in terms of the causation requirement for retaliation claims. There, the
Court rejected the argument that the text of 2(m) applied directly to retaliation claims—
specifically the causation requirement of the employee’s action being a “motivating
factor.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013).. Cf. Gardner
v. Collins, 27 U.S. 58, 93 (1829) (“What the legislative intention was, can be derived only
from the words they have used; and we cannot speculate beyond the reasonable import of
these words.”).
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filing their own Title VII claims.28 The judge reasoned that the
adverse actions were merely due to the employee making false
statements in the Title VII charge.29 But the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded,
noting that the employer’s “own candid story” suggested that
the employer used the existence of the false statement as a
pretext for the adverse actions.30 Lacking, however, was a
concise standard with which the lower court could evaluate the
plaintiff’s evidence.31
That same year, the Eighth Circuit heard a case
involving railroad employees’ claims that, in denying them
opportunities afforded to white employees, the railroad
discriminated against them based on race.32 The trial judge
dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction.33 But the appellate
court reversed, noting that Title VII was enacted in order to
enlarge the bases for discrimination, not shrink them.34 So,
while directing the district court to rehear the complaints, the
Eighth Circuit did so without any additional clear direction.35
In the end, appellate and district courts alike attempted to
wade through the murky waters of applying Title VII in
employment discrimination cases. But it wasn’t until
McDonnell Douglas that the Supreme Court announced a
coherent federal standard.
B.

McDonnell Douglas and Its Progeny

The seminal case expounding the scope of the Title VII
claim as a judicial remedy is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.36 There, Green, an African American citizen living in St.
Louis, was employed as a mechanic and laboratory technician by
McDonnell Douglas Corp. (McDonnell Douglas) until in August
1964 when he was laid off as part of an overall workforce
reduction plan.37 Green, who claimed his discharge was racially
motivated, engaged in a protest with other employees at
McDonnell Douglas’ headquarters that involved blocking the
main road that led to the plant to prevent other employees to
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1000–01 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1008.
Id.
Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 414 F.2d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1969).
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 87.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Id. at 794.
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make it to work.38 Green was arrested and ultimately pleaded
guilty to obstructing traffic, but quickly applied for reemployment only to be denied by his former employer.39
Green, a “long-time activist in the civil rights
movement,”40 filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), asserting that McDonnell
Douglas refused to hire him because of his race and
involvement in the civil rights movement in violation of the
Civil Rights Act.41 After failing to resolve the dispute, the
EEOC advised Green of his right to file a civil suit in federal
court, but the district court dismissed Green’s complaint,
finding that the company’s refusal to re-hire Green was based
solely on Green’s participation in the illegal activities and not
race.42 In reviewing Green’s evidence, the district court glossed
over the race discrimination case and focused primarily on
Title VII’s directive to stem layoffs aimed at protesting
employees.43 The district court noted that Green’s evidence—
that he was laid off for protesting and not rehired due to his
race—was not enough to suggest a nefarious motive, and that
the employer’s proffered reason of firing Green due to his
disruptive activities—was legitimate.44
Attempting to clarify the standards governing the
discrimination-retaliation claim made under Title VII, the
Eighth Circuit remanded the case while noting that Green had in
fact established a prima facie case of racial discrimination.45
Basing its analysis in the idea that there will rarely be a so-called
smoking gun demonstrating discrimination or retaliation, the
Eighth Circuit construed the Title VII regime to favor allowing a
plaintiff to present circumstantial evidence to support a claim.46
The Eighth Circuit advised: instead of treating McDonnell
Id.
Id. at 795–96.
40 Id. at 794.
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018) (prohibiting substantive racial
discrimination in an employment decision); id. § 2000e–3(a) (prohibiting discrimination
against employees or applicants for engaging in activity protected under Title VII). For
a comprehensive and easily accessible overview of Title VII’s various provisions see
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm [https://perma.cc/DR6L-BTC9]; see also
Megan E. Mowrey, Establishing Retaliation for Purposes of Title VII, 111 PENN ST. L.
REV. 893, 893 (2007).
42 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797.
43 Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 850–51 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
44 Id.
45 Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 344 (8th Cir. 1972).
46 Id. at 343 (“Employers seldom admit racial discrimination,” which “is often
cloaked in generalities or vague criteria which do not measure an applicant’s
qualifications in terms of job requirements.” (internal citation omitted)).
38
39
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Douglas’s excuse as dispositive, Green “should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate that [McDonnell Douglas’s] reasons
for refusing to rehire him were mere pretext.”47
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court set a course
to shape the standard for Title VII employment discrimination
claims for decades to come.48 In order to address the confusion
over the proper standard to apply and with whom the initial
burden rests, the Court explained that “[t]he complainant in a
Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute
of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination” and
that “[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s
rejection.”49 The Court, however, emphasized that the analysis
does not end there. The plaintiff then must:
be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated
reason for [the employee’s] rejection was in fact pretext. . . . In short,
[the employee] must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for [the]
rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.50

The Court therefore held that Green should have been
permitted a fair opportunity to offer evidence demonstrating
that McDonnell Douglas’s reasons for not rehiring him were
pretext.51 In order words, while direct evidence can make a case
easy, the smoking gun will often not exist in real world
situations of workplace discrimination. And the Court seemed
unwilling to dismiss otherwise meritorious claims just because
the “smoking gun” could not be produced.
The Supreme Court thus set forth a framework to
analyze Title VII claims that would allow a plaintiff to make
his or her case in court based on various types of evidence.
Critical to the Court’s analysis was its inclusion of possible
avenues to prove discrimination without direct evidence,
including the employer’s reaction to civil rights activities and
statistics on the employer’s prior hiring and firing practices that
could establish unlawful employment practices based on race.52 In
a succinct opinion, the Court partially adopted the Eighth
Circuit’s reasoning and crafted a burden-shifting analysis:

47
48
49
50
51
52

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 798.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 801–02.
Id. at 804–05.
Id. at 805.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05.

734

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of
the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.53 Second, if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee’s rejection. Third, should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.54

From the 1973 McDonnell Douglas decision to as
recently as 2003, the Court used this framework to decide Title
VII claims. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, for example,
two African American bricklayers, who were denied employment
with Furnco, the employer, filed a claim for employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII.55 Although the district
court found for the employer at trial, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that “under McDonnell Douglas [the employees] had
made out a prima facie case which had not been effectively
rebutted.”56 The Supreme Court, however, explained that the
Seventh Circuit had mistakenly “equat[ed] a prima facie
showing under McDonnell Douglas with an ultimate finding of
fact as to discriminatory refusal to hire under Title VII.”57 The
Court explained that McDonnell Douglas simply requires that
after a prima facie showing by plaintiff, defendant need only
“articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee’s rejection.”58 In other words, the directive of
McDonnell Douglas was not to impose an impossible burden on
the employer in the face of an employee’s Title VII claim.
In the decades following its decision in McDonnell
Douglas, the Supreme Court expanded its use of the seminal
case’s burden-shifting analysis to apply to various federal

53 In evaluating retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting analysis, courts have established that a plaintiff may make out their prima
facie case by establishing four elements: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity
as defined by Title VII; (2) the employer had knowledge of the protected activity; (3) an
adverse employment action occurred; and (4) a causal connection exists between the
protected activity and the adverse action. See, e.g., Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127,
157 (2d Cir. 2012) (listing the elements needed to establish a prima facie case); Ameristar
Airways, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 650 F.3d 562, 566–67 (5th Cir.
2011) (same); Parsons v. FedEx Corp., 360 F. App’x 642, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2010) (same).
54 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981)
(affirming the use of the Supreme Court’s Title VII analysis in McDonnell Douglas
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
55 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569 (1978).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 576.
58 Id. at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
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statutory regimes.59 In doing so, the Court ensured that this
crucial analysis, based in the Civil Rights Act’s promise of
equality, would remain an invaluable analytical doctrine in the
federal court system. But even seemingly established doctrines
are often revisited and sometimes manipulated. McDonnell
Douglas is no different.
II.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL
CENTER V. NASSAR AND ITS SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION
OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ANALYSIS

In 2013, the Court revisited its employment
discrimination jurisprudence, adding an element of causation
to the McDonnell Douglas analysis in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar. In Nassar, the
Supreme Court held that a retaliation claim under Title VII
must be established in accordance with the traditional “but for”
causation standard.60 In doing so, the Supreme Court “adopted
a rigid tort law causation standard” that one scholar suggested
“inhibits an employee’s ability to prove retaliation,” thus
making it more difficult for a plaintiff-employee to bring and
vindicate a civil rights claim.61 Moreover, Nassar and its new
standard only muddied the waters for courts’ evaluating Title
VII claims, thus making Ortiz’s seeming simplification all the
more of a drastic departure.
59 See Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353 (2015)
(finding that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
seeking “to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence may do so through
application of the McDonnell Douglas framework.”) (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 575 (1978)); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49–50 & n.3
(2003) (approvingly citing Pugh v. Attica, a 2001 case where the Seventh Circuit
applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach to an Americans with
Disabilities Act disparate-treatment claim (citing Pugh v. City Of Attica, Indiana, 259
F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2001))); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
309 (1996) (holding that a plaintiff alleging a “violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) must show that he was replaced by someone outside
the age group protected by the ADEA to make out a prima facie case under the
framework established by [McDonnell Douglas]” (internal citations omitted)).
60 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (“[A]
plaintiff making a retaliation claim . . . must establish that his or her protected
activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”).
61 Matthew A. Krimski, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar: Undermining the National Policy Against Discrimination, 73 MD. L. REV.
ENDNOTES 132, 132 (2014); see also Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Timing Isn’t Everything:
Establishing a Title VII Retaliation Prima Facie Case after University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 69 S.M.U. L. REV. 143, 146 (2016) (arguing
that the “pro-employer standard some courts have adopted as a result of Nassar is
unnecessary”); Steven Greenhouse, Supreme Court Raises Bar to Prove Job Discrimination,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/business/supreme-courtraises-bar-to-prove-job-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/ZHG2-92Q8].
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Nassar—Before and After

Several cases and legislative actions in the intervening
years from McDonnell Douglas to 2013 illustrate the
groundwork for the Supreme Court’s reasoning in University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar. In 1989, the
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins attempted to
clarify what McDonnell Douglas meant when it referred to an
adverse employment action taken “because of” an individual’s
race.62 In a plurality opinion, six Justices agreed “that a
plaintiff could prevail on a claim of status-based discrimination
if he or she could show that one of the prohibited traits was a
‘motivating’ or ‘substantial’ factor in the employer’s decision.”63
In 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which codified the lowered Price Waterhouse standard in a new
provision. The Act stated that “an unlawful employment practice
is established when the complaining party demonstrates that [a
protected trait] was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”64
More recently, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,65 the
Supreme Court again probed the causation question and
explained that, through a textual analysis of the words in
question, the words “because of” mean “by reason of” or “on
account of.”66 Therefore, Gross “declined to adopt the [lessened
causation standard] endorsed by the plurality and concurring
opinions in Price Waterhouse” in context of the AEDA.67
In Nassar, the Supreme Court for the first time
addressed the causation standard required in proving a
retaliation claim under Title VII.68 In holding that “a plaintiff
making a retaliation claim under § 2000e–3(a) must establish
that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the
alleged adverse action,”69 the Supreme Court, following
Congress’s supposed intent in enacting Title VII, adopted a

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258)
(internal quotations omitted).
64 42 U.S.C § 2000e–2(m) (emphasis added).
65 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
66 Id. at 176 (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 132 (1966); 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194
(1966); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1933)).
67 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018). Though in
Gross the Court confined its analysis to the ADEA, it would rely on its reasoning in
Gross in holding as it did in Nassar. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
68 Id. at 2523.
69 Id. at 2534.
62

63
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“rigid tort law” causation standard.70 In the years after Nassar,
scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court’s adoption of a
strict causation standard would make it more difficult for plaintiffs
to bring retaliation claim against employers, as the potential
existence of other causes for adverse actions—poor performance,
for instance—give the employer the upper hand in court.71
In 1995, the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center hired Nassar, a medical doctor of Middle Eastern
descent, to work as a faculty member and a staff physician.72 In
2004, Beth Levine was hired as a chief of medicine and became
Nassar’s superior.73 Nassar alleged that Levine was biased
against him based on his religion and ethnicity, and that
Levine made offensive comments revealing the same bias;
Levine allegedly said “Middle Easterners are lazy.”74 In 2006,
Nassar attempted to arrange a situation in which he could
leave the university’s faculty and still work at the hospital but
ultimately resigned from his position citing Levine’s
harassment as the reason for his departure.75
Nassar filed a Title VII suit including two status-based
discrimination claims. First, he alleged that the unlawful
70 Krimski, supra note 61, at 132, 143. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN &
ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 14.4 (2d ed. 2016) (“[C]ourts apply a but-for
test to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was a factual cause of the plaintiff ’ s
harm. . . . Under the but-for test, the defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the
plaintiff ’ s harm if, but-for the defendant’s conduct, that harm would not have
occurred. The but-for test also implies a negative. If the plaintiff would have suffered
the same harm had the defendant not acted negligently, the defendant’s conduct is not
a factual cause of the harm.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432:
NEGLIGENT CONDUCT AS NECESSARY ANTECEDENT OF HARM (1965) (“[T]he actor’s
negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the
harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26: FACTUAL CAUSE (2000) (“Tortious conduct must
be a factual cause of harm for liability to be imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of
harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”); id. § 26 cmt. b
(“The standard for factual causation in this Section is familiarly referred to as the ‘butfor’ test, as well as a sine qua non test. Both express the same concept: an act is a
factual cause of an outcome if, in the absence of the act, the outcome would not have
occurred.” (emphasis added)).
71 See Krimski, supra note 61, at 132 (noting that the strict causation standard
in Nassar “inhibits an employee’s ability to prove retaliation, thereby disadvantaging
employees seeking to defend their civil rights”); Edward G. Phillips & Brandon L.
Morrow, Retaliation Claims: More Difficult Standards under Nassar and Ferguson, 49
TENN. B.J. 32, 32 (2013) (noting that Nassar “creat[ed] a more onerous burden for
plaintiffs” in making a Title VII retaliation claim against an employer); Michael J.
Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705, 705 (2014) (“The obvious impact of Nassar is that it
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove retaliation.”).
72 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523. Nassar left the University’s employ in 1998 to
obtain additional education but returned in 2001 in the same role. Id.
73 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2523–24.
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harassment resulted in his discharge, and second, that efforts
to force the hospital to withdraw its offer to rehire Nassar were in
retaliation for making the bias allegations against Levine.76 While
the jury found for Nassar,77 on appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part,
finding that Nassar “had submitted insufficient evidence in support
of his constructive-discharge claim,” but that his retaliation claim
under Section 2000e–3(a) only required “a showing that retaliation
was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action” rather
than the adverse action’s but-for cause.78
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that it was the Court’s task “to define the proper standard of
causation for Title VII retaliation claims.”79 Thus, the Court
waded into the world of tort law, citing Keeton, Dobbs, Owen,
Prosser and the Restatements (Second and Third) of Torts in
attempting to determine what the plaintiff’s burden should be in
the context of a Title VII claim.80 Importantly, the Court
effectively split Title VII into two categories: Section 2000e–2,
which prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
based on the criteria listed in the statute (race, color, religion, sex,
national origin), and Section 2000e–3(a), which prohibits
discriminating against an employee for submitting a complaint
regarding a substantive violation under Title VII.81 The latter
violations are distinct from instances of workplace discrimination
because they are based on punishing employees for engaging in
protected conduct such as making a Title VII complaint.82
By separating Title VII’s substantive discrimination
provision from its anti-retaliation provision, the Supreme Court
set groundwork to logically conclude that the two subsections did
not necessarily require a plaintiff to meet the same burden of
proof.83 According to the Court, the Section 2000e–3(a) antiretaliation provision making it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an employee for engaging in a protected
activity under Title VII, was analogous to the ADEA case
discussed in Gross, which made it unlawful for an employer to
Id.
A jury awarded Nassar “over $400,000 in backpay and more than $3
million in compensatory damages” but “[t]he District Court later reduced the
compensatory damages award to $300,000.” Id. at 2524.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 2525 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
81 Id. at 2525. But cf. id. at 2534 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 2528.
76
77
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take adverse employment action “because” of various criteria.84
For that reason the Court concluded that because there was no
“meaningful textual difference” between the text of the ADEA
provision in Gross and Section 2000e–3(a), it made sense to
apply the but-for causation requirement established in Gross to
the Section 2000e–3(a) anti-retaliation provision.85
Ultimately, the Court concluded that Title VII
retaliation claims need be proved according to “traditional
principles of but-for causation,” which “requires proof that the
unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of
the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”86 Citing
employment discrimination statistics from the EEOC, the
Court noted the important policy implications that the
standard of proof for retaliation claims would have for the
country, including the drastic increase in the number of
retaliation claims made in the past fifteen years.87 Additionally,
the Court worried that “lessening the causation standard could
also contribute to the filing of frivolous claims,” which would
only be a fiscal drain on employers and agencies, not to
mention a burden on judicial resources.88 But after Nassar, not
only was the plaintiff’s burden in retaliation cases heightened,
so was the confusion over whether Nassar affected the
McDonnell Douglas standard.

Id.
See id. The Supreme Court dismissed the arguments offered by the
government that Section 2000e–2(m) allows a plaintiff to prove unlawful employment
practices that were based on a showing that a protected criteria was a “motivating
factor,” but not necessarily the but-for cause in the adverse employment action. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. at 2528. The Court, however, explained first that 2(m) does not cover
retaliation claims, but instead is more applicable to the substantive discrimination
section of 2000e-2. Id. (“[I]t would be improper to conclude that what Congress omitted
from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.” (citing Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. 58,
93 (1829), for the proposition that “[w]hat the legislative intention was, can be derived
only from the words they have used; and we cannot speculate beyond the reasonable
import of these words”)). Second, when Congress codified Price Waterhouse’s
“motivating factor” standard in 1991 by enacting § 2000e–2(m), Congress included 2(m)
as a subsection within Section 2000e-2; thus, the Court concluded, considering the
structure of the statutes themselves, it would be illogical to impute 2(m)’s standard of
proof onto the separate anti-retaliation provision. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529; see
also Gross, 557 U.S. 167, 178 n.5 (2009) (“Congress’ careful tailoring of the ‘motivating
factor’ claim in Title VII, as well as the absence of a provision parallel to § 2000e-2(m)
in the ADEA, confirms that we cannot transfer the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
framework into the ADEA.”).
86 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533.
87 Id. 2531.
88 Id. 2531–32.
84
85
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B.

Post-Nassar Application of the McDonnell Douglas
Burden-Shifting Analysis

Various courts have interpreted differently the scope of
the Supreme Court’s reasoning as to the application of the “but
for” causation requirement in Title VII cases, evincing the
confusion over a plaintiff’s burden under Nassar and McDonnell
Douglas. As it appears that this overall confusion may have been
part of the motivation for the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Ortiz,89 it
is instructive to take stock of several cases from around the
country where federal courts applied the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis in light of Nassar.90
In Pollard v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,91
the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of her gender and
claimed that her employer retaliated against her for filing the
complaint.92 The Pollard court, applying McDonnell Douglas in
light of Nassar, applied the “but-for” causation requirement at the
first stage (the prima facie stage) of the analysis during summary
judgment.93 The court determined that the retaliation claim failed
“because she is unable to establish a causal connection between
her transfer and reduction of responsibilities and her filing of
the . . . complaint” nine months earlier.94 But only two weeks
earlier, the same court cited Nassar, noting that “but for”
causation was a requirement but failed to specify how it
applied to the McDonnell Douglas analysis.95
89 Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760. 760 (7th Cir. 2016). See supra
notes 5, 7; see also infra Part III.
90 To recap, McDonnell Douglas instructs that

[f]irst, the plaintiff has the burden of proving . . . a prima facie case of
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. Third, should the
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove . . . that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1980) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Establishing a prima facie case may differ based on
which statute the plaintiff brings a claim under. See supra note 53.
91 Pollard v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 13 Civ. 4759, 2016 WL 5108127,
at *11–13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016); see also Kennedy v. UMC Univ. Med. Ctr., 203 F. Supp.
3d 1100, 1108–09 (D. Nev. 2016) (also applying the “but for” requirement at the first stage of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Kimball v. Vill. of Painted Post, No. 12-CV-6275, 2016 WL
4417121, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2016) (same; connecting the “protected activity” from the
prima facie prong with the “but for” requirement).
92 Pollard, 2016 WL 5108127, at *1, *11.
93 Id. at *13.
94 Id. at *12–13.
95 Pineda v. Byrne Dairy, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 3d 467, 478–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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Other courts have interpreted Nassar’s application
differently, applying the “but for” causation requirement to the
third prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis where the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s action was
in fact discriminatory and that the non-discriminatory reasons
given were mere pretext.96 In Ucar v. Connecticut Department of
Transportation, the plaintiff alleged that his employer “subjected
him to a hostile work environment, discriminated against him on
the basis of his national origin and religion, and retaliated against
him when he complained.”97 Despite the analogous nature of the
complaint, in Ucar, the court applied the “but for” causation
requirement to the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis: “If the employer proffers [a non-retaliatory reason for
the adverse employment action], the presumption of retaliation
dissipates and the plaintiff must prove that the desire to retaliate
was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”98
Similarly, in Hughes v. Dyncorp International, the court
seemed to suggest that the “but for” causation requirement
should be applied to McDonnell Douglas’s third prong. There,
the court determined that at the summary judgment stage, “a
reasonable jury could infer” that plaintiff’s complaint alleging
discrimination was indeed the “but for” cause and that
Dyncorp’s nondiscriminatory reason (plaintiff had attended
classes instead of appearing for work as instructed) was simply
pretext.99 The court, however, failed to state why it applied the
“but for” requirement to the third prong.100
Even as recent as 2016, it is clear that courts have been
struggling to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis, especially in
light of Nassar. Without guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
courts simply have not applied the but for causation requirement
in a uniform manner. This lack of uniformity could lead to a
damaging effect on the integrity of the court system as perceived
by society. But whether the courts were ready for another shift,
the Ortiz case changed the Title VII landscape again.
See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
Ucar v. Conn. Dep’t of Transp., No. 14-CV-765, 2016 WL 4275578, at *1 (D.
Conn. Aug. 12, 2016).
98 Id. at *12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 Hughes v. Dyncorp Int’l, LLC, No. 14-CV-109, 2016 WL 4191194, at *7 (N.D.
Miss. Aug. 5, 2016); Feist v. La. Dep’t of Justice, 730 F.3d 450. 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (“After
the employer states its reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that
the employer’s reason is actually a pretext for retaliation . . . which the employee
accomplishes by showing that the adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ the
employer’s retaliatory motive.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Green v. Rochdale Vill.
Soc. Servs., Inc., No. 15-CIV-5824, 2016 WL 4148322, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016)
(applying the “but for” requirement to the third prong of McDonnell Douglas).
100 See Hughes, 2016 WL 4191194, at *6, *7.
96

97
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THE ORTIZ DECISION—REACTION AND APPLICATION

As if Title VII jurisprudence was not complicated
enough, the Seventh Circuit in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.
muddied the waters even further. When Ortiz was published in
August 2016, commentators were quick to note that although
the decision explicitly denounced any reading of the decision
dismissing McDonnell Douglas as a current and useful
analysis,101 one could read between the lines and predict that
decisions like Ortiz could eventually lead to the demise of the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.102
Ortiz, a freight broker for the shipping company Werner
Enterprises, claimed that Werner fired him because of his
Mexican ethnicity whereas Werner claimed that he fired Ortiz
for falsifying business records.103 Ortiz sued Werner, inter alia,
for discrimination pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act
and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.104 In a Section 1981 claim, “[a]
plaintiff may prove discrimination . . . through the direct or the
indirect [McDonnell Douglas] burden-shifting method[ ] of
proof,” and because not every discrimination claim involves
overt acts of discriminations, McDonnell Douglas applicability
becomes extremely important as courts continue to utilize
McDonnell Douglas to evaluate employment discrimination
claims as a whole.105
The key facts in Ortiz are not complex. Werner offered
freight brokerage as one of its services and for that service
customers pay a fee and Werner finds transportation for their
loads; Werner then tracks the loads through a proprietary
records system, and after securing carriers, brokers update the
internal system to confirm the transactions and who gets credit
for the deal.106 Ortiz, who was tasked with tracking Werner’s
customers’ loads through a records system, was able to earn a
commission the months in which Werner generated more than
a specified profit taking the aggregate (the difference between
what customer pays and what Werner pays the carrier).107
See infra Part IV; see also infra note 131.
See infra note 131.
103 Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2016).
104 Id. Although Ortiz did not sue under Title VII, the base allegations of
employment discrimination are analogous to a Title VII claim. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/2-102 (2006) (providing that “[i]t is a civil rights violation . . . [f]or any employer
to . . . act with respect to . . . conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful
discrimination”).
105 See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., No. 13-CV-8270, 2015 WL 3961240, at *3
(N.D. Ill. June 25, 2015), rev’d and remanded 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).
106 Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 761.
107 Id. at 761–62.
101
102
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Ortiz alleged that Werner assigned him to an
unprofitable sector, and as a result, Ortiz ended up left with
several unprofitable loads.108 Though it was unclear why
Werner assigned the loads to him, Ortiz claimed that it was
racially motivated.109 Ortiz therefore altered the records to
reflect that he had not made these unprofitable assignments, a
practice he assumed was acceptable.110 When Ortiz arrived
back at work he was told that he was fired for falsifying
records—Ortiz, however, contended that Werner employees
subjected him to racial slurs and that the intensity of this
harassment increased leading up to his discharge.111
The district court granted summary judgment to
Werner. Instead of looking at the evidence of discrimination as
a whole, the court differentiated between “direct” and “indirect”
evidence, eventually concluding that Ortiz had not presented a
“convincing mosaic” because the racial slurs had nothing to do
with Ortiz’s discharge.112 The Seventh Circuit on appeal, however,
explained that “[t]he district court’s effort to shoehorn all evidence
into [the two categories] . . . detracted attention from the sole
question that matters: Whether a reasonable juror could conclude
that Ortiz would have kept his job if he had a different ethnicity,
and everything else had remained the same.”113
The court thus made it clear that “convincing mosaic” is
not a legal standard, and additionally, courts are to refrain
from separating evidence into buckets: indirect evidence here,
and direct evidence there.114 Instead, the question is whether
the evidence as a whole allows the plaintiff to make his or her case
in order to get past summary judgment and to a jury. The Court
therefore held that “[a] reasonable juror could infer that [Ortiz’s
superiors] didn’t much like Hispanics . . . and tried to pin heavy
losses on Ortiz to force him out the door.”115 Even while specifically
stating that its decision did not concern McDonnell Douglas,116 it
was portions of Ortiz like this that had commentators wondering if

Id. at 762.
Id. at 761. There were apparently other instances of which Ortiz was at
first unaware, where other brokers assigned his name to these “losing loads”; in other
words, it is further alleged that this was not an isolated incident. Id. at 762–63.
110 Id. at 762.
111 See id. at 763. Ortiz alleged that his bosses referred to him as “beaner,” “taco
eater,” “fucking beaner,” “taco,” “bean eater,” “dumb Mexican,” “stupid Puerto Rican,”
“dumb Puerto Rican,” “fucking Puerto Rican,” “Puerto Rican,” and “dumb Jew.” Id.
112 Id. at 763.
113 Id. at 763–64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 Id. at 764.
115 Id. at 766.
116 Id.
108
109
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the decision was an implicit repudiation of the burden-shifting
analysis of McDonnell Douglas.117
A.

Reaction to Ortiz by the Courts

Soon after Ortiz was decided, courts within the
jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit began applying Ortiz’s new
“test” in the context of employment discrimination cases. For
instance, in Edwards v. Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation, the court found that even when
applying the new standard promulgated in Ortiz,118 “[b]ased on
the evidence taken as a whole . . . no reasonable juror could
conclude that Defendant failed to rehire Plaintiff based on her sex
or race,” and “[w]hile Plaintiff present[ed] evidence that [she was
treated] differently than other workers, she . . . failed to connect
that treatment to her sex or race.”119 In Edwards, the treatment of
Ortiz as a new standard was less than groundbreaking, but in two
other cases, the discussion of Ortiz highlights some troubling
aspects of the Ortiz decision and its relation to existing
employment discrimination jurisprudence.
In Davis v. Brennan, the court discussed whether Ortiz
had created a new avenue to bring a Title VII claim.120 In that
case, the plaintiff brought a host of Title VII claims against her
employer including a national origin discrimination claim, a
sex discrimination claim, a discrimination claim brought under
the ADEA, and a retaliation claim.121 The court, acknowledging
Ortiz as controlling in the Seventh Circuit, found that Davis
had “failed to point to sufficient evidence to show that a
reasonable factfinder could find that Davis’ race or sex was the
reason for the alleged adverse actions taken against her,” and
thus could not defeat the employer’s motion for summary
judgment “under the Ortiz reasonable factfinder method.”122
Interestingly, the court then discussed Davis’ argument that she
could also separately proceed under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting method.123 Thus it appears that if the plaintiff

See infra Part IV.
See Edwards v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin., 210 F. Supp. 3d 931, 950–54 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (discussing the application of the new standard from Ortiz).
119 Id. at 951.
120 Davis v. Brennan, No. 14 C 753, 2016 WL 5476251, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
29, 2016).
121 Id. at *1.
122 Id. at *3.
123 Id.
117
118
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could have made her claim under Ortiz, then McDonnell Douglas
as a judicial framework may be superfluous.124
The tension between Ortiz and existing Title VII
jurisprudence is even more obvious in Knapp v. Evgeros.125
First, the Knapp court began by summarizing how courts used to
analyze employment discrimination cases: either by viewing
“direct” evidence, or when direct evidence was not available, the
plaintiff could make a prima facie rebuttable presumption of
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.126 The court, however,
notes: “That was the old way” in light of Ortiz, and that the
plaintiff must present evidence that “considered as a whole, would
allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the plaintiff was
discriminated against due to a protected characteristic.”127
While this seems like a mere recitation of the new rule,
the court continued: “McDonnell Douglas identifies one pattern
that the evidence might fit that would enable a reasonable
juror to find discrimination,” but that this pattern “is just one
way” that a reasonable juror could find discrimination.128
Continuing, the court stated that first, it should lay out the
evidence to see if it leads to an inference of whether the adverse
action was taken because of a protected trait or disability
according to McDonnell Douglas. If it does not fit the McDonnell
Douglas pattern, “the court will step back and—again,
considering the evidence as a whole—determine whether a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that [plaintiff] was
discriminated against.”129 The court ultimately held that Knapp
failed to meet her burden, but came dangerously close to
relegating McDonnell Douglas to the side: “Although [plaintiff]
cannot forestall summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas,
the question remains whether, more broadly and stepping outside
the McDonnell Douglas framework, she has adduced evidence
otherwise sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that
she was discriminated against due to her disability.”130
This language is eye-opening. One should stop and
consider whether McDonnell Douglas is truly necessary if the
plaintiff can fail to meet the standard under that analysis, but
124 In other words, if the underlying critical directive of Title VII is the ability
for the plaintiff to make his or her case and present evidence, perhaps the Ortiz’s
suggestion that the burden to present that evidence be lowered (or altered to be more
plaintiff-friendly) wins out.
125 Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 946 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
126 Id. at 955.
127 Id. at 956.
128 Id. at 956–57.
129 Id. (emphasis in original).
130 Id. at 958.
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still have another opportunity to have the court look at the
evidence as a whole. Although it was a lower court making
these comments, it seems as though Ortiz has already rooted
some real confusion in the Seventh Circuit and uncertainty as
to the lasting effect of McDonnell Douglas as a standard.
IV.

ORTIZ’S EFFECT ON MCDONNELL DOUGLAS, NASSAR,
AND TITLE VII CLAIMS IN GENERAL

Any employer, practitioner, law professor, or judge
might be somewhat startled to read some of the language of the
lower courts after Ortiz. Indeed, after Ortiz was decided law
firms, individual practitioners, and online legal commentators
immediately questioned whether Ortiz meant the downfall of
McDonnell Douglas.131 The district courts within the jurisdiction
of the Seventh Circuit have commented on Ortiz as well.132
Therefore, having already delved into the history and treatment
of McDonnell Douglas, it is necessary to make sense of how Ortiz
affects its burden-shifting framework. Having focused on how
Nassar muddied the waters of Title VII employment
discrimination cases, especially in the context of retaliation
claims, it also makes sense to determine if Ortiz will have any
effect on Nassar’s “but for” causation requirement. Finally, it is
also necessary to investigate Ortiz’s effects on the state of Title
VII claims in general.133
131 See William Goren, McDonell Douglas Dead or Alive?, LEGAL CONSULTANT:
WILLIAM GOREN’S BLOG (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/2016/08/29/
mcdonell-douglas-corporation-v-green-dead-ortiz-v-werner-enterprises/ [https://perma.cc/
4HQ9-J63F]; Jon Hyman, Did the 7th Circuit Finally Kill McDonnell Douglas?,
WORKFORCE MAG. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.workforce.com/2016/08/23/did-the-7thcircuit-finally-kill-mcdonnell-douglas/ [https://perma.cc/K6E9-7ZST]; Kevin Kraham &
Amy Ryder Wentz, Seventh Circuit to Plaintiffs: Here’s Your Burden of Proof, LITTLER
MENDELSON P.C. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/
seventh-circuit-plaintiffs-heres-your-burden-proof [https://perma.cc/3U3X-LN3H]; Elizabeth
Odian, The Seventh Circuit Clarifies Evidentiary Standards in Employment Discrimination
Cases, HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP ON JD SUPRA (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/the-seventh-circuit-clarifies-95675/ [https://perma.cc/8KLF-6SSQ]; Paul C.
Sweeney, Discrimination Claims: Focus on What Really Matters, Not a “Rat’s Nest of
Surplus Tests”, ICE MILLER LLP (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.icemiller.com/ice-on-fireinsights/publications/discrimination-claims-focus-on-what-really-matters/ [https://perma.cc/
W4FT-DSJS]; Robert W. Vyverberg & Andrew N. Fiske, Seventh Circuit Clarifies
Evidentiary Standard for Employment Discrimination Claims, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.hklaw.com/publications/seventh-circuit-clarifies-evidentiarystandard-for-employment-discrimination-claims-08-25-2016/#_ednref1.
132 See Chumbley v. Bd. of Educ. for Peoria Dist. 150, 220 F. Supp. 3d 915, 921
(C.D. Ill. 2016) (collecting cases).
133 Because Ortiz was decided by the Seventh Circuit, it would be controlling
only over those district courts within its jurisdiction. This is not to say, however, that
Ortiz cannot have drastic impacts on other courts of appeals, and ultimately, the
country if reviewed by the Supreme Court.
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Ortiz does not explicitly repudiate McDonnell Douglas
in any way; in fact, near the end of the opinion, perhaps
anticipating some of the backlash or confusion over the actual
directive of the opinion regarding McDonnell Douglas discussed
herein, Judge Easterbrook specifically noted one “point of
clarification that may be helpful”:
The burden-shifting framework created by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, sometimes is referred to as an “indirect” means of proving
employment discrimination. Today’s decision does not concern
McDonnell Douglas or any other burden-shifting framework, no matter
what it is called as a shorthand. We are instead concerned about the
proposition that evidence must be sorted into different piles, labeled
“direct” and “indirect” that are evaluated differently. Instead, all
evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole. That
conclusion is consistent with McDonnell Douglas and its successors.134

But despite explicitly stating that the opinion does not affect
the technical nature of the framework of McDonnell Douglas,
Ortiz does suggest this: that the first prong of the analysis now
matters less.135
The Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that a
reasonable juror “might infer that, because of Ortiz’s ethnicity,
Werner’s managers fired him for using techniques that were
tolerated when practice by other [employees].”136 This is
somewhat startling, because generally, a plaintiff without
direct evidence of discrimination (an incriminating email, for
example) must proceed within the McDonnell Douglas
framework, which first mandates that the plaintiff make a
prima facie case of discrimination.137 In Ortiz, however, there is
no such analysis.138
Commentators have thus expressed concern that this
lessens the importance of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.139
These effects can be seen in cases like Davis v. Brennan and
Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc., where the courts both suggested that
courts will not conduct the Ortiz test separately from a
Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766 (internal citations omitted).
See supra Section III.B.
136 Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766.
137 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 807 (1973).
138 Rather, there is simply “a common-sense discussion of whether a
reasonable juror could conclude that some protected class motivated the decision[.]” See
Hyman, supra note 131.
139 See Odian, supra note 131 (“Ortiz may signal a diminishing importance of
the prima facie case, shifting emphasis to the ultimate inquiry of whether the
employer’s rationale for its decision is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.”); but see
Goren, supra note 131 (reaching “the exact opposite conclusion” that Ortiz “may have
killed” McDonnell Douglas, and instead noting that “McDonnell Douglas in the
Seventh Circuit is the only paradigm that matters”).
134
135
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McDonnell Douglas analysis, and that if one test fails, the
plaintiff can still make his or her case under the other.140 If Ortiz
does not explicitly repudiate the balance struck in McDonnell
Douglas, it seems to suggest that the focus should now be on
taking the evidence as a whole and then skipping to the third
prong of McDonnell Douglas where plaintiff must show that an
employer’s non-discriminatory reasons are mere pretext. That is
not the balance that McDonnell Douglas struck.
An additional problem follows from reading Ortiz. The
facts of the case suggest that Ortiz alleged a substantive
discriminatory practice by his employer, something akin to
Title VII’s status-based discrimination provision.141 But assume
that Ortiz had complained to his boss before he went on vacation,
and when he came back, he was fired in the same manner and all
other facts stayed the same. If Ortiz filed a retaliation claim
under Title VII, believing that he was fired for complaining, he
would be subject to Nassar’s strict “but for” causation
requirement.142 If he had never complained, and instead filed a
status-based claim, the world of Ortiz would be open to him and
the judge would instead look at the evidence as a whole (without
any thought to “but for” causation). It seems then that any
employee who is subjected to perceived discrimination would be
smart to avoid filing even a formal complaint for fear of being
subject to the harsh “but for” requirement.
Because Nassar dealt specifically with Title VII
retaliation claims, Ortiz, which seemingly would primarily
affect the substantive discrimination section of Title VII, does
not disavow Nassar in any way. With that said, the motivation
behind Ortiz can be seen as opposing the core precepts of
Nassar. Whereas Ortiz presumably makes it easier for
plaintiffs to present their evidence, Nassar notes the need to
reign in Title VII retaliation claims and forestall frivolous
lawsuits or claims, noting that a lessened “causation standard
could also contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, which
would siphon resources from efforts by employer,
administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace
harassment.”143 Ironically, if the dissent in Nassar had won the
See supra notes 133–42 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
142 See supra Section II.A.
143 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531–32 (2013); see
id. at 2531 (“The proper interpretation and implementation of § 2000e-3(a) and its
causation standard have central importance to the fair and responsible allocation of
resources in the judicial and litigation systems. This is of particular significance
because claims of retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency.”).
140

141
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day, “Title VII’s retaliation provision, like its status-based
discrimination provision, would permit mixed-motive claims,
and the same causation standard would apply to both
provisions.”144 If that were the case, Ortiz would have the same,
potentially destabilizing effect on Title VII retaliation claims
and discrimination claims in general.
V.

POSSIBLE SOLUTION AND COMPLICATIONS

In light of the major implications for employers and
employees dealing with workplace discrimination, there is
certain to be continued confusion surrounding the scope and
the fallout from Ortiz.145 It would therefore be prudent for the
Supreme Court and Congress to acknowledge the confusing
territory the federal courts, employers, practitioners, and
employees, now find themselves in when it comes to workplace
discrimination, or at the very least, how to make a case under
Title VII. Additionally, as demonstrated by the number of EEOC
claims increasing in the past several years, courts face an
extraordinary voluminous increase in the prevalence of every type
of employment discrimination cases.146 With this increase in
volume, a cleaner standard is needed.147 Courts should thus
employ the Ortiz reasoning and look at evidence as a whole.
Put differently, a simple solution is needed, not because
it is a perfect solution, but because it is most prudent. The new
test would be simple: the evidence is to be evaluated in its
entirety, and the trial judge, who is best equipped and wellpositioned to make the call, will decide if the plaintiff has made
his or her case to proceed to trial.148 The plaintiff would still
bear a high burden at the outset, as he or she must present
enough evidence, on the whole, to show that the discriminatory

Id. at 2545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Sweeney, supra note 131 (advising clients to understand that it is still
unknown “whether the Ortiz decision will mean more jury trials in the Seventh Circuit”).
146 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S.
271, 283 (2009) (noting that “[t]he number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC
has proliferated” recently (internal citation omitted)).
147 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 32 (2009) (discussing the
applicability of the “totality of the circumstances” analysis in analyzing a possible
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
148 Appellate courts have recognized that trial judges are uniquely qualified to
rule on matters at trial concerning certain facts and evidence. See Neely v. Martin K.
Eby Const. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 337 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining how trial
judges are best equipped to deal with evidentiary issues because “[a]ppellate tribunals
are not equipped to try factual issues as trial courts are”); cf. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.
333, 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Appellate judges cannot on the basis of a cold
record easily second-guess a trial judge’s decision about likely motivation.”).
144

145
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behavior existed or that retaliation took place because of a
complaint.
In the past, certain judges have advanced the idea of
simplified and streamlined tests and standards. Justice William
Brennan once noted that “[t]he time has come to borrow William
of Occam’s razor and sever [a] portion of our analysis.”149 Perhaps
not surprisingly, it was Judge Easterbrook, author of Ortiz, who
advocated for simplicity again almost thirty years ago in Bonded
Financial Services v. European American Bank where, in
discussing “useless steps” in defining certain terms relating to
agency and banking law, he advocated that “we slice these off
with Occam’s Razor and leave a more functional rule.”150 This
same method can be applied to Title VII disputes.
Taking Justice Brennan’s and Judge Easterbrook’s
suggestions into account, the new test would be simple: the
plaintiff’s evidence is to be evaluated in its entirety, and the
trial judge, who is best equipped and well-positioned to make
the call, will decide if the plaintiff has made his or her case to
proceed to trial, weighing the employer’s legitimate reason for
the adverse action if one exists.151 The plaintiff still would bear
a high burden at the outset, as he or she must present enough
evidence on the whole to show that the discriminatory behavior
existed or that retaliation took place because of a complaint.
It is worth pausing to return to 2012 and note that
Judge Wood of the Seventh Circuit hinted at a sea change in
evaluation of Title VII litigation, arguing that judicial rules
should be as simple as possible, and specifically, concerning the
“rat’s nest” of tests concerning employment discrimination and
retaliation cases; that
[p]erhaps McDonnell Douglas was necessary nearly 40 years ago, when
Title VII litigation was still relatively new in the federal courts. By now,
however . . . the various tests that we insist lawyers use have lost their
utility. Courts manage tort litigation every day without the ins and outs of
149 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
575 (1990). See L.W. Matteson, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 296, 310 n.10 (2004)
(“William of Occam . . . is said to have remarked that ‘entiata non sunt multiplicanda
preater necessitatem,’ or ‘entities should not be multiplied more than necessary.’ As
such, where there are two competing theories or explanations, all other things being
equal, the simpler one is probably correct.”).
150 Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 894 (7th Cir.
1988). Judge Easterbrook has invoked Occam’s famous razor more than once. See R.H.
Helmholz, Ockham’s Razor in American Law, 21 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 109, 113 (2006);
see also Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is
best to take Occam’s Razor and slice off unnecessary steps and proceed directly to the
question whether the evidence would permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that the
statute has been violated.”).
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these methods of proof, and I see no reason why employment
discrimination litigation (including cases alleging retaliation) could not be
handled in the same straightforward way. . . . Put differently, it seems to
me that the time has come to collapse all these tests into one.152

Some judges seem to already be trending in this
direction. In Freelain v. Village of Oak Park, the court seems to
infer from the language in Ortiz that employment
discrimination and retaliation claim should be evaluated under
the new standard of: “Evidence is evidence.”153 One court has
since named the method adopted in Ortiz the “reasonable
factfinder method.”154
As discussed above,155 this new method and proposed
application has ramifications for McDonnell Douglas: at least
one decision has further questioned the overall importance of
McDonnell Douglas going forward: in Donley v. Stryker Corp.,
the court specifically stated that “‘[a] district court must not
limit its analysis to McDonnell Douglas,’ but broadly examine
whether ‘the record contain[s] sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable fact finder to conclude that retaliatory motive
caused [one’s] discharge.’”156 Thus McDonnell Douglas’s
preeminence as a standard may now be up in the air. In other
words, by making McDonnell Douglas optional (the plaintiff
can still succeed if he or she cannot make a prima facie case
under the burden shifting test), Ortiz relegates McDonnell
Douglas to the side. After all, if a plaintiff can still make his or

152 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J.,
concurring) (internal citation omitted); id. (“In order to defeat summary judgment, the
plaintiff one way or the other must present evidence showing that she is in a class
protected by the statute, that she suffered the requisite adverse action (depending on
her theory), and that a rational jury could conclude that the employer took that
adverse action on account of her protected class, not for any non-invidious reason.”).
153 Freelain v. Vill. of Oak Park, No. 13 CV 3682, 2016 WL 6524908, at *4 n.4
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2016) (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir.
2016)); id. at *11 (analyzing the plaintiff ’ s retaliation claim and commenting that “[p]ieces
of evidence should not be evaluated in isolation, but as a whole” as espoused in Ortiz).
154 Henderson v. McDonald, No. 15 C 4445, 2016 WL 7231606, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 14, 2016) (“The Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff can defeat a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment under the Ortiz reasonable factfinder method by
pointing to sufficient evidence to show that a reasonable factfinder could ‘conclude that
the plaintiff ’ s [protected characteristic] caused the . . . adverse employment action.’”
(alteration in original) (citing Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir.
2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. Henderson v. Shulkin, No. 17-1074, 2017 WL
6550598 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017))).
155 See supra Part IV.
156 Donley v. Stryker Corp., No. 15 C 5586, 2017 WL 66822, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 6, 2017) (alternation in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Zegarra v.
John Crane, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 655, 666 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
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her case without proceeding under the burden-shifting
framework, is it really necessary?157
But this note treats these concerns as positives—this
new standard, applying our razor, can be simple: the courts can
dispose of multi-factored tests and burden-shifting analyses and
instead refine the Title VII analysis by making it simpler: look at
the evidence as a whole, weighing all direct and indirect evidence
against any evidence presented by the employer supporting a
legitimate (non-discriminatory or retaliatory) adverse action. Of
course, it may be argued that the plaintiff should carry a heavy
burden in the face of legitimate reasons for an employer’s adverse
action. It may also be argued that the judicial system would be
harmed by allowing more cases to proceed further than they may
have without the new standard. But in consideration of the
various core values of the Civil Rights Act and Title VII, one being
that “the civil rights of every American” have the chance to be
achieved through law,158 the alternatives to not addressing our
Title VII jurisprudence are worse. To allow legitimate employee
claims of discrimination and retaliation to be disposed of due to a
lack or direct evidence or the existence of disingenuous pretextual
employer justifications would put the Civil Rights Act’s core
mission in jeopardy.
Of course, Congress can also follow the above suggestion
by passing legislation directing the courts to abandon the “rat’s
157 Various courts have noted that simpler is better when it comes to judicial
standards and rules. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80, 94 (2010) (placing
“primary weight upon the need for judicial administration of [ ] jurisdictional statute[s] to
remain as simple as possible” because, inter alia, “[s]imple jurisdictional rules also
promote greater predictability”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 620 (1980) (White, J.,
dissenting) (preferring “to adopt a clear and simple rule” regarding warrantless Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures during the daytime wherein an officer may enter a
suspect’s house after “knocking and announcing their presence”); Hugg v. Augusta Ins. &
Banking Co., 48 U.S. 595, 606 (1849) (discussing the common law rule of liability for the
destruction of good damaged during shipment, noting that “[t]he rule as settled seems
preferable, for its certainty and simplicity”); Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 629–30 (4th
Cir. 2013) (noting a preference for a “simpler rule” concerning abusive prisoner-litigants
compared to the “amorphous nature of [a] multi-factor test”); United States v. Nunez, 673
F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing a “welcome simplification of doctrine” concerning
criminal conspiracies and wholesale drug dealing).For additional commentary on favoring
simple over complex rules, see generally Eric W. Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of
Reductionist Legal Thought Simple Rules for A Complex World by Richard A. Epstein, 75
B.U. L. REV. 1441 (1995) (book review); see Helmholz, supra note 150, at 119–20
(discussing the example of Justice Brennan realizing that “the ‘scholasticist debate’
required to decide whether a remedy was legal or equitable in nature was ‘impracticable
and unilluminating.’ Better to stick with a simpler test” (internal citations omitted)); see
also id. at 115–23 for more examples of judicial interpretation of Ockham’s Razor and the
idea of judicial simplicity. But see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 566–67 (1992) (discussing, inter alia, the idea that complex
standards or rules might often be preferred to their “simple” counterparts).
158 See Brown, supra note 22, at 532.
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nest” of test they have created and instead follow the plaintiff’s
evidence.159 In terms of retaliation claims and disparatetreatment claims, the analysis is the same: if a judge believes,
based on all the evidence presented, that an employee was
discriminated against based on a protected characteristic, or
that an adverse employment action was taken based on those
characteristic, the case may proceed. And “if not, then not.”160 Of
course, the Supreme Court can clarify this before the legislature
acts, following Judge Easterbrook’s line of reasoning and
abandoning the mess of Title VII tests. Though this may be a
plausible expectation concerning Title VII disparate-treatment
jurisprudence, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would
invalidate its recent ruling in Nassar, perhaps leaving this work
to the next Justice Brennan.
CONCLUSION
This new totality-of-the-circumstances test does not
encourage a “rubber stamp” approach161 where any plaintiff
employee may prevail at summary judgment by mere
allegation alone. Instead, the judge simply must decide if a
reasonable jury could find that the discriminatory behavior
existed from the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Bright-line
rules and standards are often well intentioned; but the “rat’s
nest” of Title VII analysis has proved too unwieldy. With a
simplified directive from the Supreme Court or Congress to
view the evidence as a whole, trial judges can take solace in the
fact that they need not apply a mess of tests and analyses and
instead focus on the evidence presented and carry out the core
directive of the Civil Rights Act as was intended.
Zachary J. Strongin†
159 Skeptics as to the application of the famous Razor to the Title VII standard
can also consider the fact that courts often advance theories of totality-of-circumstances
where look at evidence as a whole. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011
(1994) (“courts must also examine other evidence in the totality of circumstances” in
cases regarding minority voter dilution under the Voting Rights Act); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (“in making [its] determination, a court hearing
an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim must consider the totality of the evidence
before the judge or jury”).
160 Pearson v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., No. 15 C 653, 2016 WL 7374235, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 20, 2016).
161 See Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 541,
548 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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